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The financial and economic crisis and 
ensuing eurozone sovereign debt crisis laid 
bare numerous failures in European policies, 
with light-touch financial regulation being 
one of the most evident policy mistakes. The 
crisis also revealed weaknesses in other policy 
domains. EU economic governance rules 
clearly proved unable to prevent a sovereign 
debt crisis from engulfing the eurozone. The 
EU’s cohesion policy was also undermined 
by the crisis. As deficits soared, some 
Member States had difficulties in providing 
necessary co-financing for cohesion policy 
projects. Furthermore, due to the faltering 
economy, earlier cohesion policy projects 
failed to generate the expected economic 
return. 
In response to these failures, wide-ranging 
policy reforms were undertaken. 
Strengthening the EU’s economic 
governance is one of the key pillars of that 
reform. Some also argue that the EU budget 
should be conditional with respect to 
economic governance rules. As cohesion 
policy is one of the major EU expenditures, 
with €376 billion proposed by the 
Commission for the 2014-2020 financial 
framework, it is a prime candidate for linking 
the EU budget to economic governance. 
Macroeconomic conditionality has 
become one of the major elements 
in discussions on the future of EU 
cohesion policy. Such conditional-
ity would make the cohesion 
budget dependent on EU 
economic governance rules. This 
would have advantages for 
economic governance and, to a 
lesser extent, the efficiency of 
cohesion policy and the EU’s 
Multiannual Financial Framework 
negotiations. Yet, conditionality 
also risks entailing serious 
disadvantages for the end 
beneficiaries and cohesion policy 
itself. If the EU decides to put 
macroeconomic conditionality in 
place, it needs to reconsider the 
design and agree on an ample 
cohesion budget. 
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Making the cohesion budget dependent on 
economic governance has become known as 
macroeconomic conditionality. It is only one 
of the conditionality scenarios under 
discussion, but it has led to the most heated 
debates.1 The Commission hopes that it 
would create additional pressure on Member 
States to comply with the reformed EU 
economic governance rules and, at the same 
time, improve the effectiveness of cohesion 
policy. But the question is if such a 
mechanism could actually contribute to the 
strengthening of rules? It seems that one can 
find many arguments in support of 
conditionality in cohesion policy, but some 
questions may also be raised. 
Despite the importance of macroeconomic 
conditionality in cohesion policy, so far only 
a few studies have been published on the 
subject. The purpose of this policy brief is to 
analyse macroeconomic conditionality as 
proposed for cohesion policy. In the first 
section, a brief description of the 
mechanisms is presented. The following parts 
concentrate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposal and conclude 
with a summary. 
THE CONTENT OF MACROECONOMIC 
CONDITIONALITY  
The idea of linking disbursements from the 
EU budget with macroeconomic 
performance is not new. Under the 2007-
2013 budget rules, it was possible to suspend 
financial support from one of the cohesion 
policy funds2, at the final stage of the 
                                                 
1 Several forms of conditionality concerning 
cohesion policy are under discussion, including: 1) 
macroeconomic conditionality, 2) ex-ante 
conditionality, and 3) ex-post conditionality. This 
policy brief concerns only the first form. 
2 The Cohesion Fund was made dependent on 
respect for the EU’s fiscal rules. Such conditionality 
was not applied to the Structural Funds. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. These rules 
have not had many results. The EU only 
threatened once to use them, against 
Hungary in 2012, but in the end no sanction 
was applied. Several weaknesses of the 
mechanism explain why macroeconomic 
conditionality has not been used: it applies 
only to a small amount of cohesion policy 
funding, concerns only fiscal problems and 
can be used only as a “nuclear option” at the 
end of a lengthy procedure. 
In its proposal for the 2014-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), the 
Commission tries to overcome these 
difficulties. Rather than reversing 
macroeconomic conditionality, the 
Commission has sought to significantly 
increase its scope. The details of the 
Commission’s proposal were laid down in a 
Draft Regulation of 14 March 2012 
(Commission, 2012) and included in the 
recent version of the MFF negotiating box 
(Council, 2012).3 
The idea is to make the disbursement of all 
Common Strategic Framework (CSF) 
expenditures dependent on Member States’ 
performance under EU economic 
governance procedures. The CSF funds 
include all cohesion policy funds, i.e., the 
Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds.4 
Macroeconomic conditionality also would 
apply to all of the stages of the economic 
governance procedures, from preventive 
surveillance and fiscal and macroeconomic 
                                                 
3 With its proposal, the Commission followed up on 
previous analyses and recommendations (see: 
Commission, 2010b; Van Rompuy Task Force, 
2010; ECB, 2010). 
4 Two funds outside traditional cohesion policy also 
fall under CSF funds: the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development, and the soon-to-be 
created European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 
While this note focuses on cohesion policy funds, 
macroeconomic conditionalities would thus also be 
relevant for these agriculture and fisheries funds. 
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imbalances to financial assistance 
programmes. 
The Commission proposes three different 
ways in which cohesion policy allocations 
could be reviewed. 
Optional Suspension of Cohesion 
Funding 
First, the European Commission may have 
the possibility to ask a Member State to 
amend its cohesion policy partnership 
contract. The Commission would be able to 
do so (while not being obligated to do so) 
when difficulties or imbalances are detected 
in a Member State. The request to modify the 
partnership contract would follow EU 
recommendations and/or warnings. The 
request to modify the partnership contract 
may occur after:  
 economic policy or employment 
recommendations, 
 measures on the basis of a eurozone 
specific treaty article (Article 136(1) 
TFEU), 
 recommendations when opening the 
excessive deficit and imbalances 
procedures, or 
 a country receives a European financial 
assistance programme (in case of the 
latter, the Commission would even be 
able to modify the partnership contract 
unilaterally). 
The request to amend the partnership 
contracts is meant to allow the Member State 
to better address its difficulties. The goal is 
thus not to cut cohesion funding. Only in 
case the Commission judges that the 
amendments of the partnership contract 
proposed by the Member State are 
insufficient would the institution suspend 
part or all of the cohesion policy payments. 
Furthermore, such a decision would only be 
taken after a lengthy procedure of up to five 
months. Because of its length, the optional 
suspension procedure does not always fit in 
well with the rest of EU economic 
governance (Verhelst, 2012). 
Mandatory Suspension of Cohesion 
Funding 
A second way to suspend cohesion funding is 
much more automatic. The Commission 
would be obliged to suspend part or all of the 
cohesion policy payments and/or 
commitments when a Member State is found 
to not to have taken sufficient measures to 
correct its fiscal or macroeconomic 
problems. The suspension of payments is 
likely to have a bigger impact than the 
suspension of commitments, as it results in 
stopping the transfer of financial means to 
cohesion projects. The suspension of 
commitments concerns future payments and 
would thus mostly have an impact in the 
longer-term. 
A mandatory suspension would only occur at 
the later stages of the economic governance 
process, when: 
 a Member State does not comply with 
the specific measures set out by the 
Council in accordance with Article 
136(1) TFEU,  
 the Council concludes that no effective 
action has been taken under the 
excessive deficit or macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure, or 
 a Member State does not sufficiently 
implement the adjustment programme 
that accompanies a European financial 
assistance programme. 
The mandatory suspension is first meant as a 
sanction. In this respect, it is rather different 
from the optional suspension of cohesion 
policy funding, which mainly serves as an 
incentive for reforms to the Member States’ 
cohesion policy priorities. 
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Potential Easier Access to Cohesion 
Funding 
The last manner in which cohesion policy 
funding allocations can be reviewed is of a 
different nature from the two previous 
options. Instead of suspending cohesion 
funding, this third option can allow for easier 
Member State access to cohesion policy 
funds. This possibility would only apply in 
case a Member State enters into a financial 
assistance programme. 
In practice, a Member State under financial 
assistance can request increasing EU co-
financing by 10 percentage points. As a 
result, the EU could potentially finance up to 
95% of a cohesion project in the poorest 
regions (instead of 85% in normal 
circumstances). Such an increase in EU co-
financing would, however, not result in the 
country receiving more cohesion funding 
than was originally foreseen. Rather, the 
money could be spent on a smaller number 
of projects. 
Nevertheless, due to the exceptional 
character of financial assistance programmes, 
it is likely that macroeconomic conditionality 
would be of a rather repressive character to 
EU members. 
WHY MACROECONOMIC 
CONDITIONALITY IS AN ATTRACTIVE 
CONCEPT 
Imposing macroeconomic conditionalities 
can have significant advantages. While the 
advantages mainly concern EU economic 
governance, macroeconomic conditionalities 
can also have beneficial effects on cohesion 
policy. Furthermore, an agreement on the 
matter could be of use in reaching 
compromise in discussions on the next MFF.  
More Means of Enforcing EU Economic 
Governance Rules 
One of the crucial flaws of pre-crisis EU 
economic governance was the inability to 
ensure a Member State’s compliance with 
European rules. The reforms that have been 
adopted in response to the sovereign debt 
crisis partly addressed this failure. Yet, the 
resulting enforcement framework still faces 
shortcomings. Macroeconomic conditionality 
can offer five advantages over the existing 
means to enforce national compliance with 
EU economic governance rules. 
First, macroeconomic conditionality is a 
more credible way of sanctioning a country. 
Current economic governance sanctions 
consist of deposits and fines that are imposed 
on a Member State. Such sanctions have an 
immediate negative impact on national public 
finances, which rather obviously adds to a 
Member States’ difficulties. Macroeconomic 
conditionality would also impose a financial 
sanction but would not lead to a direct 
increase in the fiscal deficit. Instead, it would 
result in the non-disbursement of financial 
means from the EU to a Member State. 
While the eventual consequences might be 
similar (as suspending cohesion funding will 
also have an adverse effect), the sanction is 
politically more feasible. The higher 
credibility of macroeconomic conditionality 
makes it more likely to be applied. 
As a second advantage, macroeconomic 
conditionality would allow for expanding the 
geographical scope of sanctions linked to EU 
economic governance. The existing economic 
governance rules only foresee sanctions for 
countries that are members of the eurozone. 
Macroeconomic conditionality would, in 
contrast, apply to all Member States.5 While 
                                                 
5 The UK might be exempted from macroeconomic 
conditionality due to Protocol 15 of the Treaty. 
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
5 
 
ongoing discussions rightly focus on 
strengthening economic governance inside 
the eurozone, we should not forget that the 
single market has rendered all national 
economies interconnected. Sound economic 
and fiscal policies therefore matter in every 
Member State. 
Third, macroeconomic conditionality can be 
applied earlier on in the economic 
governance process, compared to the existing 
sanctions. Conditionality can result in 
sanctions even before a corrective economic 
governance procedure is opened6. That way, 
the EU can interfere in a more compelling 
way during the early parts of the economic 
governance procedure. Macroeconomic 
conditionality can thus help pressure Member 
States to reform their policies before a full-
blown imbalance emerges. 
Macroeconomic conditionality can, as a 
fourth advantage, be applied in a more 
automatic manner than the existing sanctions. 
The introduction of reversed qualified 
majority voting7 has already reduced the role 
of the Council in decisions on sanctions. 
Macroeconomic conditionality can go a step 
further. The Commission suggests that 
sanctions would be imposed by a simple 
Commission decision or an implementing 
act. Since that would be more automatic, it 
would make macroeconomic conditionality 
sanctions less prone to political bargaining 
than economic governance sanctions. 
                                                 
6 The six-pack reform introduced the possibility of 
an interest-bearing deposit by a eurozone country 
that fails to adhere to its Medium-term Budgetary 
Objective. This deposit would be required before a 
corrective procedure is opened. Yet, the interest-
bearing character gives this deposit the role of a 
guarantee rather than a genuine sanction. 
7 Under the voting mechanism, a sanction proposed 
by the Commission is automatically adopted, unless 
the Council opposes the Commission’s proposal by 
a qualified majority within 10 days of the proposal. 
Fifth, although not fully exploited in the 
Commission’s proposal, macroeconomic 
conditionality could also serve as a positive 
incentive in enticing national policy reforms. 
As noted already, the Commission only 
proposes easier access to cohesion funding in 
case a country receives emergency financial 
assistance by the EU or the eurozone. 
However, the possibility of easier access to 
cohesion funding could be expanded to other 
phases in the economic governance process. 
In such a design, the access to cohesion 
funding could be eased in case a country acts 
upon the warnings and recommendations 
made by the EU. This would happen in 
addition to the possibility of suspending 
cohesion funding and applying penalties. 
Such a genuine carrot-and-stick approach 
could potentially be more effective than the 
existing focus on sanctions (Verhelst, 2011). 
More National Ownership of EU 
Economic Governance 
Besides being a better means of enforcement, 
macroeconomic conditionality can address 
another key flaw of EU economic 
governance – the lack of ownership in 
Member States. While rules and procedures 
for economic and fiscal policy coordination 
were agreed on the European level, they have 
not gained sufficient traction inside Member 
States. Policy coordination has too often 
developed into a bureaucratic procedure with 
minimal genuine national interest and 
commitment. 
The reforms that took place since the start of 
the sovereign debt crisis have tried to tackle 
this problem. Most notably, the European 
Semester and the Euro Plus Pact increased 
the political importance of coordination 
among Member States. Notwithstanding 
these positive evolutions, the economic 
governance procedures remain very much in 
the hands of some parts of the central 
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government. Although the regions and local 
administrations benefit from sound 
economic policies in the long-term, they 
enjoy few short-term gains in case EU 
economic governance rules are respected. As 
a consequence, their interest in economic 
governance tends to be limited. 
Macroeconomic conditionality can change 
the way sub-central governments perceive 
EU economic governance, as regions and 
local administrations would face the 
possibility of having their European funding 
cut. This threat is likely to have a significant 
impact, especially in those regions that 
strongly rely on cohesion funding. As a 
consequence, regions and local 
administrations would start to exercise more 
pressure on the central government to meet 
the EU economic governance requirements. 
In addition, local governments would have a 
bigger incentive to ensure the soundness of 
their own policies, notably their fiscal 
positions. The importance of the latter 
should not be underestimated. Local 
government spending alone represents 
almost a quarter of total public spending. In 
some Member States, local governments and 
regions run high deficits, significantly 
worsening the overall national figures8 
(Gancedo Vallina and Wahrig, 2012). 
Potential Avoidance of Wasteful 
Spending of Cohesion Funds 
Besides the potential positive impact on EU 
economic governance, macroeconomic 
conditionality can also be instrumental for 
cohesion policy. The economic results of 
                                                 
8 In some Member States, local government 
contributed as much as 1% of GDP to the 2010 
general public deficit. In decentralised countries, 
regional deficits can play an important role as well. 
In Spain, the deficits of the autonomous regions 
amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2010, which by itself 
is more than allowed under the EU rules. 
cohesion policy depend heavily on the wider 
economic and regulatory setting. Therefore, 
European funds simply cannot bear fruit if 
other factors of economic growth are lacking. 
The financial and economic crisis has shown 
indeed that the positive effects of 
investments in poorer regions can easily be 
undone by macroeconomic or fiscal 
imbalances. The real estate bubble in Spain, 
high private lending in Portugal and out of 
proportion public debt in Greece all undercut 
the results of cohesion policy. By increasing 
the effectiveness of EU economic 
governance, macroeconomic conditionality 
can help to prevent the build-up of fiscal and 
macroeconomic imbalances, and thus better 
ensure economic returns on cohesion 
projects. 
Furthermore, by working towards more 
sound national policies, macroeconomic 
conditionality would make national budgets 
more resilient to economic shocks. As a 
consequence, Member States would be less 
likely to face the huge budget constraints that 
some of them experienced following the 
financial and economic crisis. This would 
reduce the risk of Member States being 
unable to provide their part of the financing 
of cohesion projects. 
If a country does not take sufficient action to 
address its imbalances, despite all the 
European rules, macroeconomic 
conditionality sanctions can step in. Such 
sanctions would prevent using cohesion 
funding in a country where weak economic 
or fiscal fundamentals can undermine 
cohesion policy’s returns. This way, 
macroeconomic conditionality again offers 
guarantees that cohesion funding is used in 
an efficient manner. 
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Facilitating the EU’s Budget 
Negotiations? 
Macroeconomic conditionality could be a 
way to ease the difficult negotiations on the 
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework. 
During the current, very complex bargaining 
over the new EU financing period, the main 
line of the dispute is between net 
beneficiaries and net contributors. The first 
group of countries wants to maintain at least 
the current level of funding, while the other 
group insists on reducing it by about 10%. 
Given its size, cohesion policy is one of the 
most important points of the negotiations.  
The question arises whether conditionality 
attached to the second largest area of the 
budget could mitigate the impact of the 
deadly logic of juste retour? The answer is 
probably to some extent. The extension of 
macroeconomic conditionality in cohesion 
policy would meet the demands of net 
contributors for more effective use of 
available funds. One can imagine the 
introduction of extended macroeconomic 
conditionality in exchange for an ample 
cohesion policy budget as one of the key 
elements of a broader, complex compromise 
between the distant positions of net 
contributors and net beneficiaries. 
The EU could even consider expanding 
macroeconomic conditionalities to the 
Common Agriculture Policy or even to the 
entire EU budget, as demanded by the net 
beneficiaries. Such generalised 
macroeconomic conditionality might be used 
as a lever to agree a budget that approaches 
the Commission’s original proposal. For net 
beneficiaries, increased conditionality would 
then be the price they have to pay for such an 
agreement, while net contributors would 
have guarantees that the EU budget is well-
spent. However, for several Member States, 
such generalised macroeconomic 
conditionality risks being a bridge too far. It 
would furthermore give rise to numerous 
legal and practical difficulties. 
While macroeconomic conditionality could 
help in shaping a compromise, it is by no 
means a miracle solution. For example, it 
does not solve the problem of dependence 
on contributions to the EU budget based on 
Member States’ gross national income (GNI), 
which mostly creates the complexity in the 
negotiations.  
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY: 
OPENING PANDORA’S BOX? 
Despite the existence of many indisputable 
advantages of creating more links between 
EU economic governance and cohesion 
policy, there are still some questions to be 
asked and pitfalls to be avoided. If not 
properly managed, macroeconomic 
conditionality can have a highly negative 
impact. 
Incoherence in the Level of 
Responsibility 
The first issue raised by the Committee of 
Regions (Committee of Regions, 2012) and 
also by various Member States during the EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 
negotiations, concerns the level of 
responsibility. Introducing macroeconomic 
conditionality in cohesion policy would imply 
that the prospective victim of the cuts would 
be different from the level of government 
responsible for economic policy decisions. 
This is because local governments are 
beneficiaries of most of the CSF funding 
while it is most often the central government 
that is accountable for economic and fiscal 
policies. Therefore, making local authorities 
responsible for the actions of the central 
government seems quite unfair. While it’s a 
good thing that local politicians would exert 
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pressure on central governments to pursue 
sound economic policies, it is nevertheless 
doubtful whether sanctioning local 
governments for mistakes made by the 
central government is a positive evolution.  
As mentioned before, regional governments 
are also often responsible for the 
accumulation of part of the public debt (e.g., 
Spain), however fiscal policy and 
responsibility for public finances may vary 
between regions and between Member States. 
The suspension of payments in a specific 
region because other levels of government 
(other regions or the central government) fail 
to take policy actions would create some sort 
of collective punishment, which is hard to 
justify. 
More Stick than Carrot? 
As currently envisaged, macroeconomic 
conditionality’s “carrot” (i.e., easier access to 
cohesion financing) is unlikely to have a 
substantial effect. As noted already, the carrot 
can only be used for countries that are 
participating in an international financial 
assistance programme that have an 
exceptional character. It is also questionable 
whether the possibility to increase the 
maximum EU co-financing rate by 10 pp. 
could actually have a substantial effect on 
these countries due to the scope of their 
economic problems. The countries would 
obviously still face difficulties in providing 
partial financing of the EU projects, despite 
the limited increase in EU financing. 
Macroeconomic conditionality’s carrot thus 
seems to have been proposed for countries 
that would have the most difficulties in 
taking advantage of it. Besides, the rise of the 
EU co-financing rate does not mean that the 
total cohesion allocation for a particular 
Member State would be increased. The EU 
co-financing would be, in fact, used for a 
smaller number of projects than previously 
planned (Verhelst 2012).  
Furthermore, while using macroeconomic 
conditionality as a positive incentive might be 
a good idea, it runs the risk of being 
interpreted as a form of undeserved reward 
to profligate countries while other countries, 
experiencing fewer difficulties, would face 
their CSF funds being suspended. Therefore, 
the EU would have to design easier access to 
cohesion funding in such a way that it does 
not lead to moral hazard. Facilitating access 
to cohesion funding should only be the 
consequence of genuine –and often painful– 
policy reforms. Putting a framework in place 
that avoids moral hazard would require 
careful design.  
The conclusions of the 5th Cohesion Report 
suggest that conditionality should be based 
more on positive than negative incentives 
(Commission, 2010b). The Commission 
clearly did not take up this suggestion in its 
proposal. A more balanced approach 
between incentives and sanctions should be 
considered. 
Macroeconomic Conditionality and EU 
Governance Intricacies 
Looking at the Commission’s role in 
suspending the payments, it can be 
concluded that the EU’s executive arm would 
be granted large discretionary power in this 
matter. This is particularly evident if we 
compare it with the Commission's role in the 
excessive deficit and excessive imbalances 
procedures, where the Commission proposal 
may be rejected by a vote in the Council. The 
proposed mechanisms for macroeconomic 
conditionality in cohesion policy provide 
limited Council involvement. This can be 
praised by countries that want to see an 
enhanced role for the Commission in the 
EU's economic governance, but it is difficult 
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to expect that all Member States could easily 
accept such a solution. 
A comparison of the proposed form of 
conditionality with the current excessive 
deficit and excessive imbalances procedures 
leaves another question. On the one hand, 
these last two procedures provide for the 
possibility of imposing sanctions on a 
Member State that does not apply the EU 
recommendations to the amount of up to 
0.5% of their GDP at most.9 On the other 
hand, in some countries, cohesion policy 
funds constitute more than 3% of GDP each 
year (Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia). Therefore, it seems logical to 
introduce a cap on the maximum amount of 
funds in relation to GDP that could be 
suspended. Otherwise, the major 
beneficiaries of the cohesion policy (most of 
which are outside the eurozone) will risk 
becoming major victims of macroeconomic 
conditionality. As a result, Member States 
outside the eurozone would be disciplined 
more severely than eurozone members. The 
Commission has not provided details on the 
matter. Yet, a legal framework on the size of 
possible sanctions seems indispensable. 
The proposed form of increased 
macroeconomic conditionality in cohesion 
policy does not contain any differentiating 
mechanism between the eurozone and other 
Member States. Although respecting 
economic governance rules is important for 
all Member States, as was mentioned, this is 
clearly more important inside the eurozone, 
as countries sharing a single currency are 
more intertwined than the other Member 
States. As a result, a distinction in 
                                                 
9 At the end of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, a 
fine of up to 0.5% can be imposed. In the earlier 
parts of the Procedure, sanctions can amount to up 
to 0.2% GDP. In the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure, sanctions can reach 0.1% GDP. 
macroeconomic conditionality mechanisms 
between eurozone and non-eurozone 
countries would make sense.  
Additionally, EU economic governance rules 
already foresee sanctions for eurozone 
countries in case of non-compliance with the 
EU’s fiscal rules or in case of 
macroeconomic imbalances. Introducing the 
proposed form of macroeconomic 
conditionality would create a kind of double 
penalty for the same fault. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU states that no 
one can be punished twice for the same 
criminal offence (Article 50 of the Charter). 
In case of macroeconomic conditionality, 
other rules seem to apply. 
Undermining the Positive Results of 
Cohesion Policy 
Another point of concern is the impact on 
the cohesion policy’s functioning as such. Its 
mechanisms are quite distant from EU 
economic governance objectives; therefore, 
connecting these two areas may bring some 
undesired effects. 
From the perspective of efficiency, 
conditionalities might be a positive evolution. 
However, these conditions would also dilute 
the original idea behind cohesion policy. 
Under its original conception, cohesion 
funding should primarily be used there where 
it matters most, i.e., the least prosperous 
regions, and not necessarily where it can have 
the best return. In this sense, the application 
of macroeconomic conditionality sanctions 
would be detrimental to the solidarity of 
cohesion policy and its re-distributional 
nature. 
So far, cohesion funds have been seen as a 
relatively secure source for financing projects. 
The inclusion of wider macroeconomic 
conditionality in cohesion policy would lead 
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to interfering artificially in the project 
management cycle, e.g., by suspending funds. 
It might lead even to the collapse of projects 
that could contribute to increasing economic 
growth. It can ultimately result in the loss of 
reliability in the receipt of funds and thus 
might be judged as less attractive to obtain. 
This may happen in particular in beneficiary 
countries that are affected by fiscal problems 
(e.g., Hungary).  
What’s more, in certain situations, the 
sanctions may prove counterproductive. It 
may happen that the funding suspension 
could force a Member State to cancel 
projects or to finance the missing part of the 
budget on its own. This could lead to the 
cancelling or delay of other investments or 
increase public debt, thus further deepening 
the already existing fiscal problem.  
CONCLUSION  
Due to its possible advantages, 
macroeconomic conditionality is an appealing 
concept. It can be one of the measures to 
move towards a sustainable Economic and 
Monetary Union. For cohesion policy, 
macroeconomic conditionality can potentially 
lead to more efficiency. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic conditionality can be one of 
the key elements of a broader, complex 
compromise between the distant positions of 
the Member States on the next EU budget 
cycle. More European control on EU 
spending can bridge part of the gap between 
net contributors and net payers. 
However, the EU must be careful with the 
ultimate design of macroeconomic 
conditionality mechanisms so that the costs 
do not outweigh the potential benefits. By 
making all funding conditional on national 
compliance with economic governance rules, 
macroeconomic conditionality risks too 
much focus in cohesion policy on efficiency. 
This could come at the cost of the least-
prosperous regions, and thus European 
solidarity. 
Therefore, if the EU decides to maintain 
wide-scale macroeconomic conditionality, the 
original Commission proposal needs to 
undergo at least three major changes: 
1. Macroeconomic conditionality needs to 
be better aligned with economic governance 
procedures. The current one-size-fits all 
optional suspension procedure needs to be 
reconsidered. 
2. Macroeconomic conditionality should 
avoid having a disproportionate impact in 
less prosperous regions and Member States, 
as well as affecting end-beneficiaries of 
cohesion funding. This can be done by 
focusing on the suspension of commitments 
of cohesion funding, with the suspension of 
payments as a last resort only. In order to 
equal the burden of sanctions, introduction 
of a form of capping in relation to the GDP 
of the Member States is essential. 
3. Macroeconomic conditionality should 
have a better balance between incentives and 
sanctions. This can be achieved by increasing 
the possibilities for easing access to cohesion 
funding. Such a carrot-and-stick approach 
should reward thorough reforms. 
Implementing these changes would soften 
the negative consequences of 
macroeconomic conditionality. However, 
even a redesigned conditionality framework 
would have considerable adverse effects. Any 
deal on macroeconomic conditionality would 
hence have to be compensated by a 
sufficiently ample cohesion budget, especially 
with regard to the poorer regions. Efficiency 
and solidarity must be two sides of the same 
coin.  
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